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Abstract 
Slavery, long abolished under international law, left a devastating imprint on the mindset of 
Africa. However, enslavement of women through forced marriages remains a common 
phenomenon in many African states. These African states share the common feature of legal 
pluralism where traditional legal systems continue to be observed alongside national laws in 
which slavery is outlawed. Where traditional practices condone the marriage of underage girls 
who are legally unable to consent, the questioning of age-old accepted forms of marriage can 
generate strong reactions. This article traces the position of forced and child marriages in 
international law, and investigates how legality becomes a moveable target when legal systems 
exist in parallel. Despite international and African Union conventions on slavery and human 
rights declaring that marriages not based on the full and free consent of both parties are 
considered a violation of human rights and a form of slavery, these practices persist. These 
instruments are assessed to gauge the level of conformity (or variance) of African state practice 
where forced marriages commonly occur. Importantly, the reasons behind noncompliance and 
the impact of legal pluralism are explored in African states where forced marriages commonly 
occur. 
 
I. Introduction 
Forced marriage is, arguably, the most common and the least understood form of enslavement of 
women, both historically and today. It is a form of slavery almost entirely feminized and yet, 
unlike other forms of slavery, it has not been the target of the same legal and cultural responses 
and prohibitions afforded the forms of enslavement where men are included. Equally, it is an 
area of slavery that is global in its reach, and yet is little understood and studied. This article 
explores the international legal context that addresses forced marriage in Africa, and its 
relationship with plural, sometimes referred to as parallel, legal systems on that continent.1 It 
will demonstrate a significant relationship between this type of enslavement, and the presence of 
plural legal systems and point to areas of further needed research. 
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There is no reliable estimate of the number of adult women or girl children enslaved in 
forced marriages globally, or in any single region or country. Indeed, in many cultures forced 
marriages are not defined as such, in spite of clearly violating the criteria in, for example, the 
1956 UN Slavery Convention.2 Required minimum age at marriage varies from country to 
country, and often goes unenforced. Subgroups within many societies jealously guard the “right” 
to marry off girls despite protests against it, and when they do so, this practice is often 
overlooked or condoned by governments as an ethnic or cultural practice. This relativist 
interpretation of human rights opens the door to the commoditization of children. As Mike 
Dottridge notes: 
In some cultures it is still common for girls to be abducted by the bridegroom or 
his relatives, for example in parts of Bénin and Ethiopia. In others, notably in 
China, it is common for an intermediary to be involved in the abduction, in order 
to make a profit by delivering a young woman to her prospective husband: in this 
case it qualifies as trafficking. In addition to abducting women for marriage, 
however, marriage agents play a role in many societies in negotiating marriages 
and are remunerated for their efforts. On the whole this traditional role is regarded 
as perfectly acceptable.3 
In African states, where traditional (also referred to as customary) legal systems exist side 
by side with formal government structures and codified through common law, there is often not a 
clear distinction between common law and religious and traditional practices. The inevitable 
overlap between cultural, traditional, and religious practices as well as national legislation in 
many African states, speaks to this relativist approach and the extension of extra-legal control 
over the lives of young women and girls.4  
Marriage is a social institution often regulated by both traditional and codified law. 
Religious control plays an important role in many, if not most, cultures and societies, and it is to 
be expected that any alteration or questioning of the forms of marriage that are accepted or 
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required by religious dogma might elicit an extreme reaction. Even a number of those 
contemporary states that purport to most deeply value individual human rights and choice are, at 
the time of writing, caught up in controversy over the control of marriage. Many citizens of 
Western European and North American countries that are known for their breadth of civil 
liberties and the separation of religion and state, continue to deny the right to legal marriage to 
some individuals because of their choice of spouse. In these countries, legal challenges have 
been met with popular and electoral outrage, communities have been polarized, and conflict has 
resulted.  
In the same way, in many African countries the act of questioning the accepted forms of 
marriage can generate equally strong reactions, and actions and opinions not in line with cultural 
norms are often criminalized. All of this points to the extreme sensitivity across cultures when 
forms of marriage5 are questioned. This reflects an ideological undercurrent within most 
societies as powerful as the one that once guarded the legality of chattel slavery or the exclusion 
of women from full citizenship. There is a strong insistence that while many aspects of social life 
might change, marriage is sacrosanct. In the African context, traditional forms of marriage, often 
bracketed by interlocking systems of state, customary, and tribal law, have even greater 
insulation against change. In African traditional law, various aspects of an individual’s life are 
interlinked with that of their community. The importance of community and the ideal of shared 
humanity as embodied in the African notion of ubuntu, for example, are used to protect the 
individual from harm.6 
 This means that while some forms of traditional property ownership and inheritance 
patterns prevail, cases of forced marriage are concealed behind a veil of normative cultural 
practice. That veil needs to be pierced in order to understand how forced marriage has an impact 
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on the identity, status, life chances, and lived experiences of individual women. Whether through 
codified or customary law, the extensive social and legal controls over marriage mean that it is a 
status rigidly fixed and guarded. For the woman forced into marriage, with the loss of free will 
and the threat of violent control that this entails, her treatment will be concealed by both her legal 
status as a “wife” and by cultural practices and pronouncements describing this subjugation as 
“normal.” In such a legal marriage a host of human rights abuses can be obscured. Those who 
support and benefit from forced marriage suggest that this practice is simply a form of cultural 
expression, one more legitimate custom within the great diversity of human activities.  
Research on forced marriage faces two powerful obstacles. Firstly, such research violates 
a strong and widespread social belief that marriage should be unquestioned and untouchable, and 
that inquiry into, and discussion of marriage threatens social stability. Secondly, such research 
must confront the rationale that forced marriage simply reflects valid cultural norms. There is an 
ideological undercurrent within most societies that insists that while many aspects of social life 
might change, marriage is untouchable. In those countries that have interlocking systems of state, 
customary, and tribal law, traditional forms of marriage have even greater insulation against 
change. This means that while some forms of traditional inheritance patterns are protected, it can 
also mean that cases of forced marriage are concealed behind a veneer of normative cultural 
practice. 
 Much of the current debate and controversy about marriage in many societies today rages 
not over the forms or expressions of marriage, but simply over whether marriage can be altered 
at all. In a sense, the debate concerns whether the question is even open to debate, and restricting 
the focus to this point distracts from more pertinent and fundamental issues. Foremost amongst 
these is the need for a clear understanding of how marriage, particularly forced marriage, is an 
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identity and status externally fixed upon an individual. Whether through codified or customary 
law, the extensive social and legal controls over marriage mean that it is a status rigidly fixed and 
guarded. For the woman who has been forced into marriage, her enslavement is concealed by 
both her legal status as a “wife” and by a great fog of cultural practice and pronouncement 
describing this subjugation as “normal.” It is in the interest of those who are supportive of and 
benefit from forced marriage to present it simply as a form of cultural expression, just one more 
legitimate custom within the great diversity of human activity. To focus any consideration of 
forced marriage firstly on the idea that discussion of marriage is an untouchable topic, and 
secondly on the rationale that it is simply a form of marriage reflecting valid cultural norms, 
diverts attention from the key point, that of status, and the use of legal status to subjugate another 
human being. Put simply, given its support in customary law in many countries, forced marriage 
is the last legal slavery. 
In Africa, forced marriage exists in both the past and in the present. In the period 
immediately after the end of legal slavery in Africa, the effective difference between the 
purchase of a female slave and the payment of bride wealth was often fraught with ambiguity.7 
After the abolition of legal slavery, former male masters, eager to retain the labor potential and 
sexual availability of their former female slaves, were clever enough to understand that by 
reframing their previous labor and sexual relations within the institution of customary marriage, 
they would legally retain the same levels of control they had always enjoyed. It would not have 
surprised those present at the time that the payment by a man of bridewealth to secure an 
unwilling former slave bride was an attempt to repurchase within the new legal framework of 
marriage the person who had previously been his property under the framework of legal slavery. 
The woman herself was aware that this was not a marriage at all, but rather a mechanism to 
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legitimize her enslavement within a different, legally-binding social institution. There is 
evidence that some of these nonconsenting brides were able to secure divorces in court.8 It is 
assumed that others were not. It is to those women who were prevented through violence or its 
threat from walking away from the marriage that enslaved them, that attention should be most 
closely drawn, though it is virtually impossible to find these women’s voices in the historical 
record.  
However, the voices of women today who share similar stories are perhaps our truest 
guides to the enslavement and trafficking of women and children in forced marriages in 
contemporary Africa. Note as an illustrative example the well-documented case of “Evie”9 from 
Nigeria, whose father promised her to be the youngest bride of a village elder in exchange for 
money and political influence. The first time Evie met this man, she begged him to reconsider—
after all, the ceremony had not yet taken place. He raped her to demonstrate the certainty of his 
purchase. When she told her parents of the assault, her shame was met by her father’s bitter 
warning that if she continued to resist, the village elders would bury her alive. Neither her father 
nor the elders expected to suffer any consequences for her murder, since they were simply 
upholding honor within the community. Her father made it very clear to Evie that there was no 
escape from this marriage. The transaction agreement had taken place when she was a very 
young child. The bride price was paid.  
The difference between the legal purchase of an unwilling slave and the legally-
enforceable payment of bridewealth to gain an unconsenting bride is no less ambiguous today 
than it was then. The key difference is the fact that slavery is now illegal in terms of national and 
international law, as will be explored below. Yet legality becomes a moveable target when legal 
systems exist in parallel and view certain actions, such as marriage, in different ways.  
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II. Child and Forced Marriage in International Law  
We find ourselves in an important era in history in which legal slavery no longer exists and laws 
against slavery exist everywhere.  Yet, having reached this era in which antislavery laws are in 
place, we must continue to face the critical, and often humbling, question of why these laws 
often do not operate in a more meaningful way, both in domestic courts and international 
tribunals, particularly in regard to women and girls who face forced marriage. Part of the answer 
to this question naturally lies in the ability of law enforcement to bring perpetrators to 
prosecutors, but it is also ultimately found in the manner in which the crime of forced marriage, 
and ultimately the crime of slavery itself, is defined, understood, and ultimately applied by the 
judicial process. Because the law enforcement and judicial process is comprised ultimately of 
individuals who bring their own understandings of the world to work with them, we must also 
always seek to understand the ways in which legal definitions of slavery shape the larger public 
understanding of the crime of slavery, both internationally and domestically.  
To trace the recognition of forced and child marriages in international law, it is important 
to do an audit of the legal measures in place. Such an exercise will reflect those aspects on which 
the international community has consensus, but also examines the regulatory framework in 
place—the rules that states need to adhere to. Against this background the following questions 
will be considered: What is a “child marriage”? What is a “forced marriage”? Are child 
marriages necessarily forced marriages? Can involuntary marriages be considered a form of 
slavery? 
It is necessary for the purposes of this article to establish which African states are bound 
by conventions regulating marriage, slavery, and human rights. The official websites of the 
African Union10 and United Nations11 are relied on for the gathering of such information. For 
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purposes of this research, it is important to gauge the level of conformity or variance of state 
practice with the international instruments to which they are committed.  
The issues of child and forced marriage are not confined to a single international 
instrument. Instead, the regulation of child marriage through international law requires reading 
together different instruments, dating as far back as 1926, that deal with a wide range of topics 
from slavery to children’s rights. Identification and explanation of applicable provisions are 
important from a methodological perspective because this will define the terrain, and identify 
shortcomings in the regulatory environment. The next step assesses whether and to what extent 
these provisions are enforced in practice and the nature of the legal systems where these 
practices commonly occur.  
A growing body of scholarship has begun to address the question of whether forced or 
servile marriage is a violation of international law against slavery, incurring state and even 
individual liability.12 With few exceptions, this scholarship has focused solely on two contexts in 
which forced and servile marriages have taken place: in the context of war and other conflict 
situations,13 and when state courts have actively supported the practice.14 Allain demonstrates 
that the definition of slavery provided in the 1926 Slavery Convention and the 1956 
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and 
Practices Similar to Slavery is the fundamental definition of slavery in international law.15 
Furthermore, Allain posits that this definition encompasses a broad enough range of practices 
and circumstances to cover both legal slavery (and slavery as it exists today), including “servile” 
marriage.16 As such, the definitions provided in Article 1(1) of the 1926 Slavery Convention 
(“Slavery is the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to 
the right of ownership are exercised.”)17 and reproduced and augmented in Article 7(a) of the 
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1956 Supplementary Convention (“Slavery means, as defined in the Slavery Convention of 1926, 
the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of 
ownership are exercised, and ‘slave’ means a person in such condition or status.”)18 are of great 
benefit to the antislavery agenda because it allows for all forms of modern slavery to be 
recognized in international legal jurisprudence. These definitions can also be used to hold states 
responsible and individual enslavers liable for the enslavement of women even within the 
construct of the institution of marriage.  
The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was the first international 
agreement that recognized the importance of consent in the establishment of a marriage.19 The 
dual requirements that marriage should be entered into freely, and with full consent between men 
and women of full age is stipulated in Article 16 (1). No definition of “full age” is offered. 
Determination of a minimum age proved to be problematic since states had already codified 
different minimum age limits for marriage, and no agreement could be reached on a common 
minimum age.20    
The provisions on servile marriage in the 1956 Supplementary Convention, eight years 
later, were the first provisions in international law that sought to proactively prevent forced 
marriage by requiring states to enact safeguards within their boundaries to ensure consent within 
marriage.21 The 1956 Convention was thereby the vehicle through which forced marriage found 
its way onto the international agenda. Article 1 of the 1956 Supplementary Convention reads: 
Each of the States Parties to this Convention shall take all practicable and 
necessary legislative and other measures to bring about progressively and as soon 
as possible the complete abolition or abandonment of the following institutions 
and practices, where they still exist and whether or not they are covered by the 
definition of slavery contained in article 1 of the Slavery Convention signed at 
Geneva on 25 September 1926: 
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[. . .] 
(c) Any institution or practice whereby: 
(i) A woman, without the right to refuse, is promised or given in marriage on 
payment of a consideration in money or in kind to her parents, guardian, family or 
any other person or group; or 
(ii) The husband of a woman, his family, or his clan, has the right to transfer her 
to another person for value received or otherwise; or 
(iii) A woman on the death of her husband is liable to be inherited by another 
person.22  
Practices similar to slavery also include children under eighteen being delivered into forced 
labor.  
Any institution or practice whereby a child or young person under the age of 18 
years, is delivered by either or both of his natural parents or by his guardian to 
another person, whether for reward or not, with a view to the exploitation of the 
child or young person or of his labour. 23  
 
In order to control these practices, state parties “undertake to prescribe, where 
appropriate, suitable minimum ages of marriage, to encourage the use of facilities whereby the 
consent of both parties to a marriage may be freely expressed in the presence of a competent 
civil or religious authority, and to encourage the registration of marriages.”24 Parties further 
undertake to criminalize acts of and involvement in slavery. No specific reference is made to 
child marriage or to the minimum age of a marriage. This reflects the absence of clear consensus 
in the international community at the time the treaty was concluded. Some of these states’ legal 
systems often included a combination of the legal regime of the colonial ruler and traditional 
legal systems. Such multiple or plural legal systems, whether formal, religious, or traditional, 
continued to provide parallel and often conflicting provisions on child marriages for decades to 
come.  
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This matter is again addressed in the 1964 Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum 
Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages.25 Article 1 sets the requirements for a legally 
entered marriage as full and free consent of both parties, with such consent to be expressed by 
them in person.26 The crucial factor of minimum age is left to states to determine but may not be 
under fifteen years: state parties to the present Convention shall specify a minimum age for 
marriage (“not less than fifteen years” according to the nonbinding recommendation 
accompanying this Convention).27 No marriage shall be legally entered into by any person under 
this age except where a competent authority has granted a dispensation as to age, for serious 
reasons, in the interests of the intending spouses.28 An additional safeguard is that marriages 
must be registered by the competent authority.29 It may be gleaned from these provisions that 
circumstances may exist where approval can be given for the marriage of an individual under 
fifteen years old. What would be regarded as sufficiently “serious reasons” is open to 
speculation. 
This position was endorsed when the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
was adopted in 1966, requiring free and full consent for marriage between men and women of 
marriageable age, leaving the question of minimum age limitations to each of the parties to the 
Covenant. 30 The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW), adopted in 1979, mentions that the betrothal and the marriage of a child shall have no 
legal effect and that all necessary action shall be taken to specify a minimum age for marriage, 
and to make the registration of marriages in an official registry compulsory.31  
Toward the end of the twentieth century, international focus turned to enhanced 
protection of the human rights of children as a particularly vulnerable group and a number of 
binding and nonbinding instruments were focused specifically on the rights of the child in all its 
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dimensions. The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)32 takes a comprehensive approach 
to the best interests of the child33 and places child rights firmly on the international agenda.34 
This convention brings clarity to the elusive issue of minimum age by clearly defining a child as 
a person below the age of eighteen. The CRC recognizes various human rights of a child that will 
be violated in a forced marriage such as the rights not to be separated from parents,35 but also 
freedom of expression,36 association,37 and arbitrary interference with a child’s privacy and 
family.38 More specifically, it encapsulates: the right to protection from all forms of physical or 
mental violence, injury or abuse, maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse, while in 
the care of parents, guardian, or any other person;39 the right to health and to access to health 
services;40 the right to be protected from harmful traditional practices;41 the right to education on 
the basis of equal opportunity;42 and the right to protection from all forms of sexual exploitation 
and sexual abuse.43 These provisions are set off by the provision that children belonging to an 
indigenous minority shall have the right to enjoy their own culture and religion.44 This provision 
implicitly recognizes the potential for conflict between cultural and religious practices and the 
convention’s provisions. It echoes earlier treaty provisions from the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) of 196645 and the ICCPR46 that recognized the 
right to participate in and enjoy one’s own cultural life. 
III. African Instruments Regulating Child and Forced Marriage 
The struggle for African independence from colonial rule went hand in hand with the quest to 
unite the continent or pan-Africanism. The pursuit of independence and an African identity 
found expression in the establishment of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963. The 
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OAU adopted the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), which presents a 
uniquely regional interpretation of human rights while endorsing the provisions of existing 
international instruments focused on the protection of women and children.47 The African child 
is brought into focus by the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, adopted in 
1990.48 This Charter again defines a child as a person below eighteen (Article 2) and reflects on 
the variety of children’s human rights that will be violated in forced marriages as already 
protected by other international instruments. However, Article 21 is unique in that it protects 
children from harmful social and cultural practices, specifically including marriages and 
betrothals.49 The article states that “[c]hild marriage and the betrothal of girls and boys shall be 
prohibited and effective action, including legislation, shall be taken to specify the minimum age 
of marriage to be 18 years and make registration of all marriages in an official registry 
compulsory.”50  
This provision highlights the danger that cultural practices endorsed by tradition may be 
in conflict with human rights standards. Moreover, Article 29 obligates parties to prevent 
abduction, sale, and traffic in children.51 These provisions are significant, as they make clear that 
state parties to the African Charter must prohibit marriages of those below the age of eighteen. 
Regulation and enforcement is left to individual state parties to resolve within their particular 
national legal systems. This position is regulated in more detail (including a preference for 
monogamy) by the Protocol to the ACHPR on the Rights of Women in Africa.52 With the latter 
two conventions, African states have made their agreed condemnation of child marriages 
unequivocal and official. 
The picture presented by the various UN and African treaty provisions identified above 
clearly answers the questions posed. Marriages not based on the full and free consent of both 
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parties are considered a violation of human rights and a form of slavery. Those under the age of 
eighteen are not in a position to consent to marriage. States who are parties to these conventions 
should adopt legislation to enforce a minimum age (eighteen) and the required registration of 
marriages, as well as criminalize acts of slavery. Despite having these instruments in place, early 
and forced marriages still commonly occur across Africa.53 Public pressure from civil society 
organizations and political opinion are mounting to put an end to these practices. The 
Ouagadougou Declaration on Child Marriages adopted in 2003 by six African countries with 
high percentages of forced and underage marriages (Burkina Faso, Ghana, The Gambia, Mali, 
Nigeria, and Sudan) and the Forum on Marriage and the Rights of Women and Girls call for 
more stringent enforcement of treaty provisions and the addressing of conflicting laws. The 
Declaration calls upon governments and the African Union to address the legal gaps created by 
plural legal systems by adopting:  
a clear and unambiguous position on child and forced marriages and rectify the 
legislative loopholes between religious, customary and civil marriages, and sign 
the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights 
of Women in Africa and ensure that special measures are taken to help end this 
practice.54 
The following table illustrates ratification of treaties by African states where child 
marriages are most prevalent.55 
 
Mali Niger Chad CAR Mozambique Cameroon Ethiopia Zambia Guinea 
Slavery 
Convention 
x x 
   
x x x x 
Consent to 
Marriage 
Convention 
x x 
      
x 
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ICCPR x x x x x x x x X 
r48(1) 
CEDAW x 
 
x x 
 
x X 
r 29(1) 
x x 
CRC X 
r 16 
x x x x x x x x 
ACHPR x x x x x x x x x 
African charter on 
rights of the child 
x x x  
s 
x x x x x 
Protocol on rights 
of women in Africa 
x s s s x x s x x 
 
Key: 
x - States are a party to the convention through ratification or accession  
s- Signature (Needs to be followed by ratification before a state can be regarded as a party.)  
r- Reservations excluding certain treaty provisions. Reservations may not be contrary to object 
and purpose of convention. 
 
The above table indicates the African states that have universally ratified the ICCPR, 
CRC, and the ACHPR. The older convention (slavery) is not ratified by three out of the ten 
states, while the Consent to Marriage Convention has only been ratified by three states. This 
loophole is closed by full ratification of the CRC and, bar one (Central African Republic), full 
ratification of the African Child Convention. Generally speaking, these states sparsely made 
reservations to the treaties; thereby, opting out of few treaty provisions.56 States seem to be more 
reluctant to commit themselves to protection of women in Africa. The Central African Republic 
16 
adopted a cautious approach by not committing itself to conventions that run contrary to 
domestic practices. The reasons for this approach require further research. 
IV. National Trends  
A high number of child marriages appear to take place in West and Central Africa where two out 
of five girls are child brides, according to a 2012 publication by the United Nations Population 
Fund.57 The United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) provides another 
perspective.58 This agency surveyed women aged twenty to twenty-four across the world and, if 
they were married, recorded their age at the time of their first marriage. UNICEF aggregated 
such data to show the proportion of women who were married or in a union before age fifteen, 
and those who were married or in a union at age fifteen or after, but before age eighteen.59 
According to UNICEF, 41 percent of girls in West and Central Africa were married before age 
eighteen, and 16 percent were married before age fifteen. For Sub-Saharan Africa, the figures 
were 39 percent and 13 percent respectively. For Eastern and Southern Africa, 38 percent were 
thought to be married before age eighteen, and 10 percent before age fifteen.60 
V. Reasons why Early and Forced Marriages Occur in These States 
There are many reasons why child and forced marriage occur at high rates in the African states 
listed above. Although contributing factors are often related, this article does not focus on the 
obvious socioeconomic reasons, such as poverty and gender inequality, but rather assess why 
this practice, so clearly a violation of the states’ international obligations, manages to occur and 
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flourish within its domestic legal systems. 
The demarcation of Africa into states by former colonial powers did not take account of 
natural geographical borders, and as a result, divided indigenous communities. When African 
states became independent, they decided to retain colonial boundaries, despite how arbitrarily 
drawn by imperial powers, according to the international legal principle of uti possidetis.61 The 
OAU regarded this as the wisest course of action to prevent the disruption that would result from 
redrawing boundaries based on ethnicity.62 Consequently, modern African states are 
multicultural societies with various legal systems.63 International law recognizes and protects 
different African cultures and traditions. However, these practices take many forms, some of 
which may include practices such as female genital cutting and child marriage, which are clear 
violations of both UN and AU conventions.  
Despite being party to international instruments prohibiting child and forced marriages as 
well as the existence of implementing national legislation, states suffering from high percentages 
of child and forced marriage seldom have adequate legal and bureaucratic frameworks to enforce 
laws. A national legal framework should not only prohibit child and forced marriages (including 
legislating penalties for violations), but it should also provide an infrastructure to correctly 
reflect the date and registration of marriages. Inadequate legal frameworks, however, tend to 
exist alongside customary and religious laws that condone the practice.64 The reality is that 
society observes a plurality of legal rules, which can impact both legal certainty and the rule of 
law. Dominance of traditional practices is more prevalent in rural areas. UNICEF statistics 
indicate that the proportion of women married by the age of eighteen tends to be higher in rural 
than in urban areas.65 UNICEF also found that belonging to a minority religious or ethnic group 
is also a significant predictor of child marriage in some countries.66 
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VI. State Practice on Child and Forced Marriages 
What is the level of implementation and enforcement of the relevant treaty provisions on child 
and forced marriage by states? Ideally, this study would include a full reference to legislation and 
case law in force in the nine African states identified above that deal with slavery, forced 
marriage, and underage marriage, in order to establish to what extent the states have given effect 
to their international obligations. Unfortunately, these sources are not readily available. Instead, 
available material on three of those countries: Chad, Mali, and Niger serve to illustrate the 
problem posed by forced and child marriages and the influence of legal pluralism on attempts to 
regulate these issues. The information on Chad and Mali is sourced from UN treaty monitoring 
bodies and legislation that is electronically available. The reports from the official treating 
monitoring bodies serve as reliable sources because they respond to states’ reports on the level of 
implementation and related problems experienced in a given state. In the case of Niger, a court 
judgment illustrating national enforcement will be considered. Although incomplete, this 
information underlines concerns about effective legislation against child and forced marriages. 
A. Chad 
In 2011, as required by CEDAW, Chad presented a report to the Committee on the Elimination 
of Discrimination against Women on measures taken to give effect to the provisions of the 
Convention.67 In its concluding observations, the Committee highlighted the problems created by 
traditional law as well as forced marriages.68 The Committee expressed its concern about the 
lack of clarity with respect to the actual status of customary and religious law vis-à-vis national 
law, its impact on the effective incorporation of the Convention in the national legislation and on 
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its effective implementation in the state party. This was due to the strong patriarchal character of 
Chadian society, as well as the guarantor role of the traditions and customs of the country 
constitutionally granted to traditional leaders.69  
The Committee made the following recommendations: 
a) To raise awareness on the precedence of national law over customary law 
and of the Convention over national law, within the judiciary, and among 
traditional and religious leaders;  
(b) To carry out a comprehensive review process of its legislation with a view 
to, inter alia, repealing existing discriminatory provisions against women within 
customary, religious and modern laws and guaranteeing that these bodies of law 
are harmonized with the Constitution and the Convention; and set up a clear time 
frame for the completion of such review process.70 
The Committee was also concerned about the existence of a combination of customary, 
religious, and modern marital laws, which contain discriminatory elements against women. In 
particular, it expresses its concern about “the persistence of early marriages, despite its 
prohibition under article 9 of the Act on reproductive health (2002).”71 
The Committee called on Chad to raise “the minimum age of marriage for women to 18 
years, guarantee[] equal inheritance and succession rights to women and recognize[] the full 
legal capacity of women, with a view to bringing it in line with the Convention.”72 The 
Committee also urged Chad to undertake awareness-raising activities throughout the country on 
the negative effects of early marriages for girls, highlighting in particular the long-term effect on 
women with regard to the enjoyment of their rights to health and to education.73 
The CEDAW report on Chad’s implementation of women’s rights encapsulates the 
tension between customary law vis-à-vis national and international law, when it comes to 
marriages. Implementation of legal requirements that run contrary to traditional laws are 
especially problematic in patriarchal societies where the role of traditional leaders are 
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constitutionally protected. The Committee gave a clear indication of the appropriate hierarchy of 
norms: customary law should be subordinate to national law and national law subordinate to the 
Convention. The continued occurrence of child marriage under customary law calls for an 
official response from Chad to address the problem. 
B. Mali 
Despite having officially ended slavery in 1960, Mali has yet to criminalize slavery.74 The 
Constitution of the Republic of Mali has all the elements one would expect in a modern 
constitution. The constitution recognizes the individual rights of all Malians including: the right 
to liberty,75 freedom, and equality;76 it has a constitutional court to oversee the constitutionality 
of governmental action and law; and it recognizes the superiority of ratified and published 
treaties over Mali’s national law.77 Despite this provision, the CEDAW Committee points out 
that Mali’s national legislation does not provide sanctions for acts of discrimination based on sex 
or remedies for victims of such acts.78 The Committee is concerned about,  
[T]he persistence of discriminatory provisions that deny women equal rights with 
men concerning issues related to the transmission of nationality, marriage and 
family relations and access to land. Such discriminatory provisions include: a 
younger marriageable age for women (15 years old) than for men (18 years old); 
termination of maintenance support awarded to an ex-wife on grounds of immoral 
behaviour; in the event of divorce, restitution to the husband of benefits given to 
his wife and limitations on the exercise of parental authority by a surviving 
mother; and discrimination against women concerning their customary land 
rights.79  
C. Niger: The Koraou judgment 
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The Koraou judgment is an example of how an African interstate court did not shy away from 
taking on the issues of forced marriages and slavery. Slavery within marriage in Niger was 
considered before the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) Community Court of 
Justice (ECCJ) in 2008 in a well-documented, landmark decision, Hadijatou Mani Koraou v. 
Niger.80  
 On 27 October 2008, the Community Court of Justice of the Economic Council of West 
African States (ECOWAS) determined that the Republic of Niger had failed to protect twenty-
four year-old Hadijatou Mani Koraou from slavery.81 Hadijatou Mani Koraou was born in 1984 
into an established slave class. Her mother was a slave and Hadijatou inherited her mother’s 
slave status. Like all slaves in Niger, she could be inherited, sold, and made to work without pay. 
At the age of twelve, she was sold for $400 by her mother’s owner to a man named El Hadj 
Souleymane Naroua, who brought her into his household as a Sadaka or “fifth wife.” The fifth 
wife has no status and remains essentially a sex and domestic service slave for her master. Any 
children she bears remain his property. Sadaka or wahiya, according to the ECOWAS Court:  
[C]onsists of acquiring a young girl, generally under the conditions of servitude, 
for her to serve both as domestic servant and concubine. A woman slave who is 
bought under such conditions is called a sadaka, or ‘the fifth wife,’ that is to say, a 
woman outside those legally married (the number of which cannot exceed four, in 
accordance with the recommendations of Islam)… The sadaka generally carries 
out the domestic chores and caters for the ‘master.’ The latter can, at any time, 
during the day or night, engage her in sexual relations.82 
Her master had four wives and seven other Sadaka. For nine years, she was kept as a 
slave within his household, where she performed domestic chores and was repeatedly raped. In 
order to elevate her status from Sadaka to wife, Naroua gave her a “liberation certificate” in 
2005. Later produced in Court, the certificate stated that “I, El Hadj Souleymane Naroua have 
liberated Mme Hadijatou Koreau on this day 18 August and she is now free and is no-one’s 
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slave.”83 The certificate was signed by “the chef du village,” “the master,” and the “beneficiary.” 
When she attempted to leave, her master explained that she was not free to leave after all; her 
status had simply been upgraded from that of a slave to a concubine. She eventually fled and 
married another man, at which point, Naroua complained to law enforcement. Officials then 
prosecuted and jailed her for bigamy. 
Hadijatou Mani Korau’s case is seminal, but virtually singular, and its success pivots on 
the fact that the Nigerian Courts were complicit in her enslavement. State action was, therefore, 
more than clear. After her complaint was considered, the ECCJ condemned Niger for failing to 
protect Koraou from enslavement. Created in 199684 to adjudicate interstate human rights 
litigation, the court was empowered by a supplementary protocol adopted in 2005 to hear 
individual human rights cases.85 The amending protocol allowed the court direct access to the 
judicial forum for West African litigants in the African human rights system where direct access 
to regional adjudication remains limited.86 The court has no requirement that local remedies must 
be exhausted before receiving a case, and that judgments are directly enforceable in national 
legal systems of states.87 In this particular case, the judgment not only found an affirmative 
obligation for states to protect citizens against slavery, but also that Niger had to pay ten million 
Central African Francs (CFA) to the victim.88  
One scholar considers the impact that this judgment has made on the domestic system of 
Niger where, despite the criminalization of slavery from 2003, thousands remain enslaved.89 He 
finds that effective enforcement of the law and effective domestic remedies are still lacking due 
to the following factors: slavery-related matters are not handled with the required diligence, as 
required by a circulaire issued by the Ministry of Justice;90 inadequate knowledge of antislavery 
legislation by investigating officers;91 and failure to “properly characterize” the facts of the case 
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due to cultural or religious bias of the police or gendarmerie.92 In fact, slavery is denied at the 
highest state level and antislavery activists have been arrested.93 
The effect of this decision in Mali, where thousands continue to be enslaved, remains to 
be seen. It is worth noting, however, that the American Bar Association established a law clinic 
in 2011 with a local antislavery NGO to provide free legal advice as well as to train lawyers, 
police, prosecutors, and judges on handling slavery cases.94 
VII. Plural Legal Systems 
As indicated above, child marriage is a form of slavery as well as a clear violation of 
international law. Despite the fact that most of the Sub-Saharan African states subscribe to these 
international instruments and have outlawed slavery in their national laws, the problem persists. 
Attitudes stemming from traditional and religious beliefs that tolerate or even encourage these 
practices may be at fault. In many contexts, these practices are in line with customary law.  
This raises the question: which legal rules do citizens acknowledge as binding—those 
coming from a supposedly democratic or undemocratic legislature, or those they believe to be 
endorsed by religion or custom? Human rights instruments rightfully acknowledge the validity 
and value of diverse cultures, religions, and traditional practices while condemning those 
practices that are considered “harmful,” broadly defined. The preservation of minority rights, 
particularly culture and a traditional way of living, is also well documented in international 
law.95 What, however, is the outcome when legal systems conflict, particularly with regard to 
“traditional” matters of home and family? Given the intrinsic legitimacy, or popular acceptance, 
that traditional legal systems might have among groups within a larger society, challenging such 
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beliefs may have far reaching consequences, both for the individual and for the larger 
community.  
Plural legal systems reflect situations where different legal systems are observed within a 
single sovereign state or one socioeconomic space: customary rules remain operational in a 
modern context alongside statutory law. According to van Niekerk, a scholar who comments on 
customary law in a South African context, legal pluralism owes its existence to prevailing 
cultural pluralism and can be interpreted in either a narrow or a broad sense. Narrowly 
interpreted, legal pluralism refers to a “dual systems” approach where European and Western 
law runs parallel to traditional forms of law in a single society and both are officially recognized 
by the state. Customary law is generally accepted by the state as legitimate and binding provided 
it is consistent with wider society's views of what is moral and in the public interest. This 
approach, however, often fails to explain the social realities in modern African states.96 The 
broad interpretation of legal pluralism refers to a factual situation that exists in a society where 
various legal systems are observed.97 Von Benda-Beckman offers some conceptual arguments on 
legal pluralism in a wider sense: plural legal orders are “based on different sources of ultimate 
validity and maintained by forms of organization other than the state.”98 These situations, he 
suggests, call for analysis of empirical situations instead of conceptual a priori’s and 
stereotyping.99 Social phenomena relating to harmful traditional practices may have a legal 
character, but may also be nonlegal. Von Benda-Beckmann suggests that the concept of law is 
not linked to the state by definition, and is broad enough to include plural legal systems.100 He 
acknowledges that this idea has anthropological roots, and will not be shared by judges who will 
be bound to apply a positivist conceptualization of law.101 He argues that asymmetrical power 
relations between the colonial ruler and the indigenous minority supported the development of 
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legal pluralism in colonial societies.102 Von Benda-Beckmann also mentions that some legal 
pluralists believe that rules should vary based on the circumstances, including in the instance of 
marriage.103 
Elements of both narrow and deep legal pluralism may be detected in states where forced 
marriages occur. These marriages may take place under customary rules that are either officially 
recognized by the state or factually observed and tolerated. The additional influence of 
international law on a dual system scenario becomes further complicated because international 
law presents a third level of legal rules. International law addresses this situation by expecting 
states to bring their national law in line with treaty obligations, when they become party to a 
treaty. Governments should either address conflicting practices based on custom, or enter 
reservations excluding certain practices from falling under the treaty. This use of reservations has 
been employed by Muslim states to exclude treaty provisions conflicting with the Islamic 
Sharia.104 The factual situation as observed under deep pluralism will be more difficult to 
address since customary law is not officially regulated. Therefore, it will also be more difficult to 
regulate offensive practices. 
The question of local acceptance or legitimacy of legal rules is crucial to address the 
problem of forced and child marriages. In a study of the rule of law in Africa, Funmilola Abioye 
highlighted that legal rules have very little chance of being complied with in societies where they 
do not enjoy grassroots legitimacy.105 Legitimacy can be measured by the extent that legal rules 
reflect the identity, perceived self-interests, and expectations of those they seek to bind.106 
Mainstream national law may not have infiltrated the belief system of traditional, often minority 
groups, and traditional systems remain operational on a day-to-day basis. Julie Endy describes 
plural legal systems as a failure of legal penetration that compromises the rule of law.107 With 
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reference to Guatemala, Endy argues that de facto existence of plural legal systems benefit 
indigenous populations, specifically in relation to developing alternative methods of dispute 
resolution.108 Given that Africa has responded to the challenge to regulate forced and child 
marriages through homegrown treaties, it will be difficult to argue that these provisions should 
not speak to traditional African societies. The onus is now on national governments to facilitate 
both the legal infiltration of customary law, and dissemination of treaty provisions amongst 
traditional societies. This would require both legal reform and cultural adjustments to change 
nonlegal rules. 
VIII. Measuring the Relationship between Plural Legal Systems and Child Marriage 
As noted above, the idea of a relationship between plural legal systems and child and forced 
marriage is not new. However, this assertion has never been empirically tested. A recent 
compilation of data on contemporary forms of slavery by the Global Slavery Index109 has made 
possible a database of 167 countries recording human rights violations and risks. As noted above, 
each year UNICEF assembles and disseminates information about child marriage around the 
world. These data sources provide estimates of the percentage of women, aged twenty to twenty-
four, who were married or in a union before the age of eighteen. Using this data, UNICEF 
creates an ordinal child marriage measure for each country on a scale from one to five, where 
one equals the least number of child marriages and five equals the most child marriages. We use 
this measure of child marriage as a proxy for adult forced marriage for two reasons. First, no 
uniform measure of forced marriage of adults currently exists. Second, we assume that high 
levels of child marriage and early marriage will be correlated with forced adult marriage.  
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 Types of plural legal systems that were described above can be identified and quantified 
through another recognized source. The CIA World Factbook records the type of legal system in 
place for each country listed. The entry for the country of Afghanistan, for example, reads: 
“mixed legal system of civil, customary, and Islamic law.”110 In comparison, the legal system of 
the United Kingdom is described as, “common law system; has nonbinding judicial review of 
Acts of Parliament under the Human Rights Act of 1998.”111 In other words, it is not a mixed 
system. In compiling the data for this research, any country with a mixed legal system and a 
mention of traditional, customary, or Islamic law is recorded as having a plural legal system. 
When these two variables are mapped by country, an apparent pattern emerges. Map 1 
shows the distribution of the prevalence of child marriage, there are clearly regions in which this 
violation is more pronounced. Globally, the countries reported to have the highest incidence of 
child marriage are Bangladesh, Chad, Ethiopia, Guinea, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nepal, and 
Niger.112 These are the countries shown with the darkest shading in the map below. Countries 
with the next highest level of child marriage are shown in lighter shading. 
Map 1—Geographical Prevalence of Child Marriage 
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Plural legal systems are not recorded in degree but as a dichotomous variable. Map 2 
shows countries that have plural legal systems. As can be seen, a majority of those countries 
recorded as having a plural legal system are in Africa, but countries with plural legal systems 
also include, among others, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, 
Albania, Cambodia, Ireland, and Israel.  
Map 2—Countries with Plural Legal Systems 
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A further test of this relationship is to measure the statistical significance of the 
probability that child marriage occurs within a plural legal system. Using the UNICEF child 
marriage variable as a dependent variable (ranked on a scale from one to five, where one 
represents very low levels of child marriage and five represents the highest levels of child 
marriage), and using the plural legal systems variable (where one represents the presence of a 
plural legal system and zero represents its absence) as the independent variable, the following 
results were obtained and shown in Table 1.  
For 162 countries, the relationship between child marriage and plural legal systems is 
significant, measured by the Chi2 statistic as greater than 0.00001.  
Table 1 - Ordered Logit Model, Child Marriage and Plural Legal Systems 
________________________________________________________ 
   Childmar | Odds Ratio   Std. Err.       z      P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
___________________________________________________________ 
    Plural   |   4.327521   1.304403     4.86   0.000     2.397009    7.812833 
___________________________________________________________ 
       /cut1 |  -.2757436   .2078558                           -.6831335    .1316463 
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       /cut2 |   .5287656   .2118798                             .1134887    .9440424 
       /cut3 |   1.777046   .2524713                            1.282211    2.271881 
       /cut4 |   3.723325   .4004133                              2.938529     4.50812 
There are two key points to be made from this statistical test. The first is that the logit 
regression results suggest that the odds of being ensnared in child marriage are about four times 
greater in the presence of a plural legal system, other things being equal. The second key point is 
that, while this is shown to be a statistically significant relationship, the strength of that 
relationship is weak as measured by the pseudo R2 at .0513. This suggests that other factors are 
more important in determining the prevalence of child and forced marriages than simply the 
presence of plural legal systems. This second point is not surprising, as it indicates the 
complexity of the inter-relation of cultural influences, such as gender roles and religion, and that 
of governance factors. Statistically, this is referred to as multicollinearity, and the usefulness of 
regression analysis is that it allows us to examine the independent effects of a factor such as 
plural legal systems.113 In the future, we hope to bring other determinant factors to the statistical 
analysis of forced and child marriage. 
IX. Conclusions and Indicated Future Research 
There is a clear and statistically significant relationship between child marriage and the presence 
of plural legal systems. Results suggest that the same relationship exists for adult forced 
marriage, but currently there is a lack of data to test this empirically. As noted above, there are 
complex interrelations between customary laws, national laws, and international conventions and 
treaties. The key aim of this article was to illuminate this interrelationship, and point to areas 
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where it has failed to protect girls and women from forced marriages. Also, appropriate laws can 
protect girls and women, when there is sufficient political will and consensus to do so. At best, 
this study is offered as an initial, exploratory work that will serve to open this area of inquiry. 
Clearly, it raises more questions than it answers. 
For example, this artivle provided a review of some of the legal systems in Africa that 
struggle with the contrasting aims of customary versus national laws, much more insight is 
needed in the application of plural legal systems in each country—including those countries 
outside of Africa that have plural systems. Additionally, forced marriage, while clearly rejected 
by international conventions, continues to be commonplace around the world. Forced marriage, 
however, remains largely unmeasured and often unregulated, or even mentioned, in national 
laws. This leads to several questions: How do we understand this phenomenon, how do we 
define it legally, and how might it be operationalized for further social scientific and human 
rights study? Corruption and the absence of the rule of law is thought to be a significant predictor 
of the prevalence of slavery, but how might the presence of plural legal systems, particularly 
where the rule of law is weakened, be an equally significant predictor of forced marriage 
slavery? What other factors have the greatest explanatory power in predicting the presence of 
child and forced marriage in different countries? Answers to these questions are crucial to the 
development of appropriate and efficient policies that protect the lives of girls and women.  
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